Legal Updates
Legal Updates
Amended Court
Rule
MCR 2.107 was
amended effective January 1, 2008. The
amendment to the rule allows parties to stipulate to agree to e-discovery or
service of papers among the parties by e-mail.
Further, the amendment requires that court clerks note the date
pleadings are filed if that date is different than the date the filing is
docketed.
The amendment
permits some of all parties to agree to service by e-mail by filing a
stipulation in the case. However, e-mail
service is subject to several conditions, including:
·
The
stipulation must include the e-mail addresses and for attorneys the address
must be the same as currently on file with the State Bar.
·
The
stipulation must include all limitations and conditions such as the document
size, designation of exhibits, the obligation if any to furnish paper copies,
and others designated to receive e-mail service on behalf of a party.
·
Documents
must be in PDF format.
·
Provisions
for signatures if requires.
·
A
subject line that indentifies the case and document being sent.
·
An
e-mail sent after 4:30 p.m. is deemed to be served the following business day.
·
A
party may withdraw from the stipulation with 28 days notice.
·
Service
is complete upon transmission.
·
The
sender shall maintain an archived record of sent items.
The content of
the amendment is available at
2007-12
– Amendment of Rule 2.107 of the Michigan Court Rules
Recent Court
Decisions
·
Grandparent
Visitation
Brinkley v Brinkley, ____ Mich App _____ (COA # 269725,
10/16/07)
Holding: The section of the grandparent visitation statute, MCL
722.27b(5), which requires the court to dismiss a petition for visitation when
two fit parents jointly oppose it, does not unconstitutionally violate the
grandparents' due process or equal protection rights.
Summary: The parents of two minor children were
divorced in 1999. The mother became estranged from the maternal
grandparents and together with the children's father cut off contact. The
maternal grandparents filed a petition for grandparenting time under MCL
722.27b. The trial court dismissed the petition because both parents
signed an affidavit stating that they opposed an order for grandparenting time.
First, the court
of appeals noted that grandparents have no fundamental right to grandparent
visitation and therefore the statute only has to be rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. Because a
fundamental right is not implicated, the court found that this statutory
provision is rationally related to the legitimate goal of encouraging
grandparenting time without infringing on the parent’s fundamental right to
raise their children. The court also
found that the statute did not deprive the grandparents of procedural due
process by not giving them the opportunity to challenge the parents’ joint
opposition to grandparenting time. The
statutory scheme to defer to parents’ preferences would be thwarted if
grandparents were permitted to challenge the parent’s opposition. Finally, the court found no equal protection
violation by treating these grandparents differently from grandparents of
children whose parents do not oppose visitation. The court found a rational basis to
distinguish between these classes of grandparents based on the parents’
fundamental right to make decisions concerning their children.
Keenan v.
Dawson,
____ Mich App ____ (COA #265725, 6/5/07)
Holding: The court
rejected respondent Dawson’s argument that the grandparenting statute, MCL
722.27b, was unconstitutional, affirming the lower court’s decision, which
found that the grandparents showed by a preponderance of evidence that the
denial of grandparenting time did create a risk of substantial harm to the
child.
Summary: The trial court
accepted the grandparents’ argument that since their grandchild’s mother had
been murdered when he was 20 months old, and since the mother had been
estranged from the father, they were in the position to teach him about his
mother and keep her spirit alive for him and awarded them grandparenting time. On appeal, the father argued that the statute
was unconstitutional as applied to him, but the court found that this issue was
not property preserved because defendant failed to present it in the trial
court. Defendant next argued that by
failing to give deference to his decision to deny grandparent time the trial
court violated his constitutional right to raise his child. The court rejected this argument as well,
finding that the trial court did not simply give “lip service” to the statutory
presumption, but found that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to
overcome the presumption.
·
Parental
Termination and Domestic Violence
In re Engle, minors (DHS v Engle), Unpublished, Docket no. 275064 (8/9/07)
Holding: The court reversed and remanded the
trial court order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights for, among
other reasons, the court’s failure to consider the effect of domestic violence
on mother’s ability to properly parent the children.
Summary: Respondent-mother’s children were
sexually abused by their father over a period of time while respondent failed
to investigate and to protect them.
Respondent argued that she waited so long to reveal the abuse because
she was abused and controlled by her husband.
The evidence showed that respondent and the children were dominated by respondent’s
husband and feared him and that he became incarcerated at the outset of this
proceeding for his abuse. In support of
the court’s finding that a mistake was made in this case, it noted: CPS had
very limited contact with respondent and failed to assess her ability to parent
the children in the absence of the father’s abusive presence; the court failed
to noted that respondent’s passive-dependent personality was partly caused by
the abuse and she therefore required long-term therapy; the circumstances in
respondent’s home had changed – her husband was incarcerated, they were
divorced and respondent and the children were in therapy. For these reasons the court concluded
termination of respondent’s parental rights was contrary to the children’s best
interests.
·
Change
of Domicile
Spires v
Bergman, ____ Mich App
____ (COA #276722, 8/21/07)
Holding: Where a parent
is awarded sole legal custody, MCL 722.31 (the 100-mile rule) does not apply
and the court need not consider the change of domicile factors enumerated in
MCL 722.31(4).
Summary: Plaintiff had
sole legal and physical custody of her child, and defendant father had
reasonable parenting time. The plaintiff filed a motion for permission to move
with the child from Michigan to Texas, where she had greater family support. Defendant responded asking for sole custody. The court of appeals rejected defendant’s
argument that the court must apply the D’Onofrio factors listed in the
statute. The court found that when the
legislature codified the factors, it specifically exempted cases where the
relocating parent had sole legal custody.
Further, the court found no legal authority to support defendant’s
position that the trial court should have decided the change of motion
first. Even if it had, there was no
evidence that the outcome would have been different.
Note: See also Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App
462 (2007), (the court must consider whether a change of domicile would result
in a change of the established custodial environment, which would then require
a best interest analysis).
· Personal
Protection Orders
Bachand v.
Wethmann,
Unpublished, Docket #270161 (6/14/07)
Holding: The trial court did not err when it entered a
PPO under the stalking statute where a threat three years after the first
showed a “continuity of purpose” because the second was a reminder of the
first.
Summary: The court
rejected respondent’s challenge to a personal protection order (PPO),
concluding that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the two threats
respondent made toward petitioner constituted “a continuity of purpose” for the
purpose of establishing a “course of conduct”
as required under the anti-stalking PPO statute, MCL 600.2950a. Respondent argued that his two threats towards
petitioner did not establish a continuity of purpose because three years had
passed between the first and second threats. The court of appeals held that the lower court
had not erred in finding a continuity of purpose because the second threat was
a reminder and reiteration of the first threat and there is no requirement as
to the distance in time between the two acts. The court further concluded that
petitioner’s awareness of respondent’s arrest for a violent crime supported
petitioner’s claim of emotional distress.
· Paternity
People v.
Nugent,
____ Mich App ____ (COA #267069, 7/3/07)
Holding: In an action to
revoke defendant’s acknowledgement of parentage, a mistake of fact was shown
based on defendant’s mistaken belief about paternity. However, the case was remanded for the trial
court to also consider the equities of the case before revoking the
acknowledgement.
Summary: Defendant
thought he was the biological father of a child and signed an acknowledgement
of parentage. DNA testing later
determined that defendant’s son was the child’s father. Although defendant signed the
acknowledgement, the statute provides for a claim of revocation based on a
mistake of fact. MCL 722.1011. The court of appeals found that the statute
was satisfied based on defendant’s believe that he was the biological father at
the time he signed the acknowledgement.
However, the statute also requires that revocation is proper considering
the equities of the case. The trial
court failed to make such a determination and the case was remanded on that
issue.
National
Activity
Pending Federal Legislation
The National
Domestic Violence Volunteer Attorney Network Act (S 1515) was recently
introduced in the U.S. Senate. According
to the ABA, which strongly supports this bill, it would harness the skills and
dedication of volunteer lawyers to provide desperately needed legal assistance
to domestic violence survivors. There
are five components of the bill:
- Create a National Domestic Violence Volunteer Attorney
Network to be managed by the American Bar Association Commission on
Domestic Violence
- Connect domestic violence victims with legal assistance
via the National Domestic Violence Hotline
- Create a pilot program and national rollout of the
National Domestic Violence Volunteer Attorney Network and Referral Project
- Establish a Domestic Violence Legal Advisory Task Force
- Require the Government Accounting Office to study
existing legal services available to battered women and report back to
Congress within a year.
Jessica
Gonzales v U.S., before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (10/5/07)
Jessica
Gonzales’ children were abducted and murdered by her husban. She sued the police department on a failure
to protect claim based on her protection order but lost before the U.S. Supreme
Court. The decision of this Commission
holds that Ms. Lenahan (Gonzales) exhausted all domestic remedies (i.e. that
she pursued every potential legal avenue available to her but had those doors
closed to her). The decision also indicates that countries in the Americas,
including the U.S., are responsible under the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man for protecting victims of domestic violence from
private acts of violence. This is the first time that the Commission has ever
made such a pronouncement. This admissibility decision is the first phase of a
two-step process before the Commission. The next step is the merits
phase, where the Commission will decide whether the US and the Castle Rock
Police Department/Colorado violated Ms. Lenahan (Gonzales') and her children's
human rights. (Specifically, the rights to life, non-discrimination, family
life/unity, due process, petition the government, and the rights of domestic
violence victims and their children to special protections).
For more information on the Gonzales case, and to view the Commission's
admissibility decision, go to http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2007eng/USA1490.05eng.htm
or http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/32105lgl20071005.html
To view Ms. Gonzales' testimony before the Inter-American Commission in March
2007, see http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/gonzalesvusa.html.
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